The GPS jamming of EU President von der Leyen’s aircraft over Bulgaria has exposed the extent of Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign against Europe—a systematic assault on democracy, infrastructure, and security that’s escalating rapidly.
On September 1, 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s aircraft lost GPS navigation while approaching Plovdiv, Bulgaria, forcing pilots to resort to paper maps for landing. This unprecedented interference with a top EU official’s flight wasn’t an isolated incident—it was the latest salvo in Russia’s intensifying hybrid warfare campaign that’s targeting the very foundations of European security.
The Invisible War at Europe’s Doorstep
What unfolded over Bulgarian airspace represents far more than a technical malfunction. According to an E.U. document, Poland logged 2,732 cases of interference in January 2025, up from 1,908 in late 2023. Lithuania recorded 1,185 cases in the same month, more than double the figure from March 2024. Latvia’s Electronic Communications Office said it recorded 820 cases of interference with satellite signals in 2024, compared to 26 in 2022.
This dramatic surge in GPS jamming incidents reflects a coordinated strategy that European officials describe as “not random incidents but a systemic, deliberate action by Russia and Belarus”. The Kremlin’s electronic warfare units, particularly the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center operating in the Kaliningrad region, have been systematically disrupting civilian navigation across Europe’s eastern flank.
Beyond GPS: A Multi-Domain Assault
Russia’s hybrid warfare extends far beyond electronic interference, encompassing a sophisticated campaign designed to destabilize European societies through multiple vectors:
Cyber and Electronic Warfare: In 2025, France has attributed to the GRU cyberattacks targeting electoral process, media and other public and private critical entities. Since 2024, Estonia has seen a notable spike in cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, particularly satellite-based cyberattacks disrupting airport operations.
Physical Infrastructure Attacks: In May 2025, Polish authorities confirmed that Russian intelligence was behind the fire that destroyed the large shopping centre in Warsaw the previous year, damaging over 1,400 shops and service outlets. In March 2025, Kremlin-linked agents conducted an arson attack on an IKEA store in Lithuania.
Baltic Sea Cable Sabotage: The most concerning trend involves Russia’s “shadow fleet”—a network of aging vessels used to evade sanctions and conduct covert operations. In December 2024, the Eagle S tanker was suspected of cutting four subsea data cables and the Estlink 2 submarine power cable. An undersea data cable between Latvia and Sweden was damaged in January 2025, with Swedish authorities boarding the Bulgarian-owned vessel that was sailing from Russia.
The Shadow Fleet: Russia’s Maritime Weapon
Russia’s shadow fleet has emerged as a particularly insidious threat to European security. This network now reportedly comprises over 1,000 ships—approximately 17 percent of the global tanker fleet. These ships operate under complex ownership structures, fly flags of convenience, lack Western insurance and frequently disable tracking systems to conceal their movements.
The fleet serves dual purposes: circumventing oil sanctions while conducting sabotage operations. Experts say that a ship dropping anchor and dragging it along the seafloor for an extended distance would be noticeable for a crew and push a ship off course, suggesting deliberate intent behind recent cable damages.
In May 2025, Estonian authorities were able to board the Jaguar tanker when Gabon revoked its provisional registration, leaving the ship without a valid flag—demonstrating how European nations are adapting their legal strategies to counter these threats.
Europe’s Fragmented Response
Despite the escalating threat, European responses have been largely reactive and fragmented. The scope of so-called hybrid attacks blamed on Russia includes arson attacks, incidents where ships have damaged undersea communications cables, disruption of GPS satellite navigation signals, and the hacking of computer infrastructure. The uptick of incidents coincided with Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, launched in February 2022, and spiked in 2023 and 2024, quadrupling over that period.
NATO has responded with increased patrols: NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission on January 14, 2025, which includes maritime patrol vessels. However, challenges remain significant. NATO faces a major challenge in surveilling some 145,560 square miles of sea crisscrossed by as many as 4,000 ships per day.
The Democratic Dimension
Russia’s hybrid warfare particularly targets democratic processes. In December 2024, Romania’s constitutional court annulled the 2024 presidential election after intelligence services confirmed Russian interference via fake social media accounts and cyberattacks on election systems. Belgian investigators raided the home and offices of a European Parliament staffer to investigate his involvement in spreading Russian propaganda ahead of the June 2024 European elections.
This electoral interference represents a direct assault on European democracy, using sophisticated information operations to undermine public trust in democratic institutions.
The Economic Stakes
The economic implications of Russia’s hybrid campaign are staggering. Submarine cables carry more than 97 percent of the world’s telecommunications and support financial markets, facilitating over $10 trillion in daily financial transactions every day. Any sustained disruption to these systems could trigger widespread economic chaos across Europe.
Looking Forward: The Need for Integrated Defense
The GPS jamming incident involving von der Leyen’s aircraft serves as a wake-up call for a more coordinated European response. European ministers reported that GPS jamming and spoofing had been observed since 2022 in the Baltic Sea region, mainly from Russia and Belarus, and that GPS interference from aircraft had increased dramatically since August 2024.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte cautioned that the entire continent is now under direct threat from Russia’s escalating tactics, emphasizing that “we are all on the eastern flank now, whether you live in London or Tallinn”.
The EU is beginning to adapt: Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said the EU would increase the number of satellites in low earth orbit to better detect interference. The Council recently imposed restrictive measures against nine individuals and six entities responsible for Russia’s hybrid activities.
The Path Forward
Europe faces an unprecedented security challenge that requires both immediate countermeasures and long-term strategic thinking. The hybrid nature of Russian attacks—deliberately staying below the threshold of conventional warfare—demands innovative responses that bridge civilian and military domains.
As one senior official noted, “This is the war that is going on in the shadows”. The GPS jamming of von der Leyen’s aircraft has brought this shadow war into the light, forcing European leaders to confront the reality that they are already under attack.
The question is no longer whether Russia will escalate its hybrid campaign, but how quickly and effectively Europe can develop integrated defenses to protect its democratic societies, critical infrastructure, and economic prosperity from this new form of warfare. The continent’s security—and the future of European democracy—may well depend on the answer.
The GPS jamming incident represents just one visible manifestation of Russia’s comprehensive hybrid warfare strategy. As attacks continue to escalate across multiple domains, Europe must move beyond reactive measures to develop a proactive, integrated defense that can counter threats across the spectrum of hybrid warfare—from cyberspace to the Baltic seabed.
